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COMMENTS
AN OVERSECURED CREDITOR'S RIGHT TO POSTPETITION INTEREST
ON MORTGAGE ARREARAGES: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
BANKRuPTcY CODE SECTIONS 506(b), 1322(b)
AND 1325(a)(5)(B)
Wade v. Hannon, 968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992)
In Wade v. Hannon,1 the Tenth Circuit concluded that 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(b)2 requires a Chapter 13 debtor' who cures a default on the mort-
gage of his principal residence pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)4 to pay
interest on prepetition arrearages to an oversecured creditor, even if the
mortgage instrument is silent on the issue and state law would not man-
date such payment.'
1. 968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992).
2. Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after
any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim,
there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reason-
able fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
II U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
3. A Chapter 13 debtor is a person who files for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30
(1988). See also infra note 6.
4. Section 1322(b) provides in part:
[Tjhe plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of
unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of any default
within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any
unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which
the final payment under the plan is due.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988). See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
5. 968 F.2d at 1042. This Case Comment only addresses whether an oversecured creditor is
entitled to interest on arrearages when a Chapter 13 debtor cures a default on mortgage payments.
This Comment does not address what the appropriate interest rate might be in the event that the
court awards interest. For an overview of interest rate possibilities, see Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119, 123 (6th Cir. 1985); Thomas 0. Depperschmidt,
Choosing the Proper Interest Rate in Bankruptcy Proceedings Resolution of Special Issues in the
Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 N. KY. L. REv. 457 (1991).
In addition, the question whether a denial of interest on arrearages constitutes a "taking" in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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In this consolidated case, the debtors filed for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Bank-
ruptcy Code" or "Code") 6 in three separate actions.7 When they filed,
the debtors had defaulted on oversecured mortgages on their principal
residences.' The Chapter 13 plans required the debtors to make all fu-
ture monthly principal and interest payments in accordance with the re-
spective loan documents and to cure the prepetition defaults by making
monthly payments to compensate for the missed payments-the arrear-
ages.9 Neither the mortgage agreements nor the Chapter 13 plans re-
quired the debtors to pay interest on the arrearages, costs, or attorneys'
fees.10
In each case, the mortgagees brought suit seeking interest on the ar-
rearages, attorneys' fees and costs created by the debtors' prepetition de-
faults.11 The bankruptcy court denied the mortgagees' requests for
interest in all three cases. 2 On appeal, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma consolidated the cases and af-
firmed the bankruptcy court's findings. 3 The Tenth Circuit reversed
6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). In particular, Chapter 13 of the Code undertakes
to solve problems which its predecessor caused by misunderstanding and erratic application. The
underlying purpose of Chapter 13 is "to permit an individual to pay his debts and avoid bankruptcy
by making periodic payments to a trustee under bankruptcy court protection, with the trustee fairly
distributing the funds deposited to creditors until all debts have been paid." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
7. 968 F.2d at 1037.
8. Id.
9. Id. The plans also required the debtors to reimburse the creditors for attorneys' fees and
default penalties owed under the mortgage agreements. Each mortgage instrument also included a
five dollar late-payment charge. Id.
10. Id. The mortgage agreements authorized 10% per annum interest on any amounts the
mortgagees had to incur for insurance payments, taxes and assessments because of the mortgagors'
defaults. The bankruptcy court awarded this interest to the creditors. The Tenth Circuit assumed
that this action was not disputed because neither the district court nor the parties' briefs addressed
the debtors' responsibility for this interest payment. Id. at 1037 n.4.
11. Id. at 1037. The mortgagees relied on 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(b) and 1325(a)(5)(B). Id. Section
1325(a)(5)(B) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim;
and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (1988). See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
12. 968 F.2d at 1037.
13. Id. The district court held that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) prevents the application of I1 U.S.C.
§§ 506(b) and 1325(a)(5) to these cases. Id. at 1037-38.
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and remanded the case, holding that Chapter 13 debtors must pay
postpetition interest pursuant to section 506(b) on arrearages and other
charges because a cure is simply a statutory modification of an over-
secured claim. 14
In order to resolve the interest-on-arrearages issue, courts must con-
sider the interplay between, and the interpretation of, three sections of
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 506(b)"5 grants an oversecured creditor
the right to postpetition interest in addition to the repetition claim. 6
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this Code section broadly
in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. 7 In Ron Pair, the Court
held that section 506(b) grants an oversecured creditor the right to
postpetition interest on both nonconsensual", and consensual" allowed
claims.2' Although the Court relied on the "plain meaning" of the statu-
tory language to reach this conclusion,2" it specifically noted that neither
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code nor the legislative history of sec-
tion 506 compelled a different result.22
Similar to section 506(b), 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)23 suggests that
14. 968 F.2d at 1040-42. For a more in-depth discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra
notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 2 for the text of § 506(b).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) dictates that § 506 applies to Chapter 13 proceedings. Section 103(a)
provides: "Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3 and 5 of this title apply in a
case under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 .... 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
17. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
18. "Nonconsensual" claims are "involuntary secured claims, such as a judicial or statutory
lien which are fixed by operation of law and do not require the consent of the debtor." Id. at 240
(citations omitted).
19. "Consensual" claims are "voluntary... secured claims, each created by agreement between
the debtor and the creditor and called a 'security interest by the Code .....'" Id. (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 237. In Ron Pair, the United States filed a nonconsensual claim for unpaid withhold-
ing and Social Security taxes, penalties and interest. Id. Although Wade, unlike Ron Pair, involved
a consensual claim, the Ron Pair Court erased any distinction between the two types of claims for
the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Id. at 243. Moreover, Ron Pair's significance to the Wade issue
lies in its liberal approach towards awarding interest payments.
21. Id. at 242.
22. Id. at 243. The legislative history offers no indication of whether postpetition interest is
allowable. Id. at 243 n.6. "Neither the Committee Reports nor the statements by the managers of
the legislation" make any mention of postpetition interest. H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
356 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 32398 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. 33997 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). For an in-
depth discussion of Ron Pair, see Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code: The Right, the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 361.
23. See supra note 11 for text of § 1325(a)(5)(B).
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postpetition interest is allowable. This Chapter 13 "cram down"'24 provi-
sion dictates that plans must protect secured creditors' liens and pay the
full present value of the claim during the life of the plan.25 Numerous
courts have concluded that this section requires payment of postpetition
interest on secured claims to compensate the creditor for the reduction in
the claim's value over time.26
The third provision of the Code that courts must consider is 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b).27 This section bars a Chapter 13 debtor from "modifying" a
claim secured only by an interest in the debtor's principal residence,28
but permits the debtor to "cure" a default on a long-term29 debt such as a
mortgage.30 Generally, debate concerning interest on mortgage arrear-
24. Cram down is a "colloquial expression that describes court confirmation of a bankruptcy
plan, notwithstanding creditor opposition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 366 (6th ed. 1990).
25. According to the legislative history, Congress enacted I 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) to "protect
the secured creditors of Chapter 13 debtors." Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re
Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 124 CONG. REC. S17406 (daily ed. October 6, 1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6550); 124 CONG. REC.
H11089 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6481).
26. See, ag., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982)
(construing § 1325 to require payment of current interest rate on arrearages due under automobile
loan agreement); In re Casseil, 119 B.R. 89, 93 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990) (holding that the market
rate of interest is the proper figure for discounting the Chapter 13 debtor's future payments to satisfy
the present value test); In re Miller, 13 B.R. 111, 112-13 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981) (relying on the
legislative history of the Chapter 11 cramdown provision which emphasizes the "time value of
money" as decisive on the issue).
27. See supra note 4 for text of § 1322(b).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
29. Long-term denotes that the last payment is due beyond the life of the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(5) (1988).
30. Id. For the history of "cure," see generally 5 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 1322.09[2] (15th ed. 1986). Collier traces the history of bankruptcy cure provisions to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act in 1938, which created Chapter 13.
Originally, plans could not provide for mortgage creditors because the definition of claims did not
include claims secured by real property. To alleviate problems for debtors, courts granted injunc-
tions against foreclosures on mortgages during the pendency of Chapter 13 cases where foreclosure
would defeat the plan's purpose. Under the Bankruptcy Rules of 1973, the injunction became auto-
matic upon filing a petition. Id. In its proposal to Congress, the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States codified this common-law practice of granting injunctions. Because the
Commission placed claims secured by real property within its version Chapter 13, the Commission's
bill included specific provisions for cure. Id. In explaining the version of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) which
Congress adopted, Representative Edwards stated:
Section 1322(b)(2) of the House amendment represents a compromise agreement between
similar provisions in the House bill and Senate amendment. Under the House amendment,
the plan may modify the rights of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by
a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. It is intended
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss1/4
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age focuses on whether paying interest pursuant to either section 506 or
section 1325 is an impermissible modification under section 1322(b)(2) or
simply a statutory aspect of curing a default under section 1322(b)(5).31
Currently, the United States Courts of Appeals differ on the appropri-
ate way to apply these Bankruptcy Code sections when determining
whether a Chapter 13 debtor must pay postpetition interest on repetition
mortgage arrearages a2 In 1985, the Sixth Circuit first discussed the issue
in Cardinal Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Colegrove (In re Cole-
grove). 33 A divided panel awarded interest payments to the mortgagee. 34
First, the court concluded that interest on arrearages is not a "modifica-
that a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence may be treated under Section
1322(b)(5) of the House amendment.
Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985)
(citing 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6481)). See also Grubb v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236
(5th Cir. 1984) (outlining the legislative process behind the Bankruptcy Code in general and
§ 1322(b) in particular). But see In re Hobaica, 65 B.R. 693, 695 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986) (legisla-
tive history of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) is "extreme in its paucity"); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 536 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1981) (legislative history is "sparse").
31. See infra notes 32-88 and accompanying text.
32. Lower courts are similarly divided on the issue. The majority of lower courts hold that a
creditor is not entitled to interest. See BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL Es-
TATE, PART E BANKRUPTCy LAW § 24A.22(f) (1992) (announcing that denial of interest is the
majority rule). See, eg., In re Thompson, 127 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (agreeing with
cases denying interest); In re Murray, 116 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990) (interpreting a
mortgage contract requiring debtors to pay "interest at the contract rate ... of this Note on amount
so declared due. . ." as not "specific enough" to entitle mortgagee to interest on arrearages); In re
Kooker, 106 B.R. 233, 235-36 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1989) (proposing that specific and favorable treat-
ment of home mortgage debt provided for by § 1322(b) means that a Chapter 13 plan cannot modify
terms, including interest terms, except to cure); In re Stamper, 84 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988) (concluding that § 1325 is inapplicable because a cure is not a modification). But see, ag.,
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Adams, 142 B.R. 331, 333 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that an interest
payment awarded pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B) is incidental to cure and not an improper modifica-
tion); In re Parker, 125 B.R. 479, 482-483 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (allowing interest pursuant to
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) because, if it is not allowed, home mortgage creditors will not receive the same
benefits as non-home mortgage creditors); In re Hall, 117 B.R. 425, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990)
(holding that present value of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requirement is applicable even in the absence of
modification of contractual rights pursuant to § 1322(b)(2)).
The circuit level cases discussed infra contained simple fact patterns which, for the most part,
resemble the scenario in Wade. Basically, each case involved a debtor whose Chapter 13 plan cured
repetition defaults on mortgage payments, but did not provide for interest on the arrearages.
33. 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985). Aware of its ground-breaking role in clarifying bankruptcy
law on this subject, the court expressly commented that it "found little direct precedent on a ques-
tion which must arise with some frequency in the bankruptcy context." Id. at 120.
34. Id. at 122. At the time of this early decision, the majority of lower courts awarded interest
on mortgage arrearages. Id. Allowing interest on arrearages is now the minority position. Further-
more, legal commentators upheld the decision as embodying sound rationale. See, e-g., Comment,
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tion" of the loan agreement as prohibited by section 1322(b)(2), but
rather a requirement which is "merely incident[al]" to a cure." Second,
because the court had held previously that an unsecured party would
receive interest under section 1325(a),36 it would be "anomalous" to deny
this right to a creditor with a security interest in real property. 7 In a
frequently cited dissent, Judge Celebrezze rejected the majority's argu-
ment and proposed that the loan agreement must specifically provide for
interest on arrearages in order for it to constitute part of a cure.38 Ac-
cording to Judge Celebrezze, allowing interest on arrearages clearly mod-
ifies the contract in contravention of section 1322(b). 9 In addition,
Judge Celebrezze argued that sections 506(b) and 1325(a)(5) should not
apply to security interests in principal residences because such interests
are unique and subject to a completely separate Code provision, section
1322(b)(2). 40
In Foster Mortgage Corp. v. Terry (In re Terry),4" the Eleventh Circuit
reached a different conclusion, holding that a creditor with a security
interest in the debtor's principal residence may not collect interest on
mortgage arrearages when a Chapter 13 debtor cures a default, unless the
mortgage document explicitly provides for it.42 The Terry court based
its decision exclusively on the relationship between sections 1322(b) and
Payment of Interest for Mortgage Arrears Under Chapter 13 Plan Consistent with Bankruptcy Code,
52 LEGAL BULL. 103, 105 (March 1986).
35. 771 F.2d at 122.
36. See Hardy v. Cinco Fed. Credit Union (In re Hardy), 755 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985) (constru-
ing § 1325 as requiring interest on unsecured creditor's claim).
37. 771 F.2d at 122.
38. Id. at 123.
39. Id. at 124. Judge Celebrezze noted that Congress could not have intended a mortgagee to
profit from the debtor's bankruptcy. Such a windfall might occur if the market interest rate and the
contract interest rate differed. Id.
40. Id at 124-125. In addition to quoting floor statements by Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeCon-
cini as support for the premise that home mortgage claims warrant special treatment under the
Code, see supra note 30 for text of Rep. Edwards' statement. Judge Celebrezze cited many cases in
which other courts asserted that Congress intended to regulate security interests in residences differ-
ently from ordinary claims. Id. at 125 (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d
236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that the primary purpose of § 1322(b)(5) is "to enable a debtor to
preserve the equity in his home and to restore and maintain his currency on long-term debt"); In re
Simpkins, 16 B.R 956, 963 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (stating that the purpose of § 1322(b) is "to
allow debtors to make regular payments on mortgages and to protect long-term lenders"); United
Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that the purpose of
§ 1322(b)(2) is "to provide stability in the long-term home financing industry")).
41. 780 F.2d 894 (1lth Cir. 1986).
42. Id. at 895.
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1325(a)(5); it did not consider section 506(b). The court concluded that
the legislative history of section 1322(b) reveals a congressional intent for
the section to form an exception to section 1325(a)(5)(B).43 Moreover,
the court held that section 1325(a)(5)(B), which governs creditors whose
claims were modified," does not apply to claims secured by interests in
personal residences45 because the Code prohibits modification of these
claims.46 In justifying its holding, the court placed significant weight on
a lender's ability to secure interest on arrearages simply by providing for
it in the loan agreement.47
Following Terry, the Third Circuit, in Appeal of Capps,4" similarly de-
termined that the present value provision of section 1325(a)(5)(B) does
not apply when a Chapter 13 debtor cures a mortgage default under sec-
tion 1322(b). The court held that section 1325(a)(5) did not apply unless
the plan modified the mortgage contract.49 Moreover, a cure is not a
modification, and because section 1322(b)(5) governs the curing of long-
term debts, the mortgagee is not automatically entitled to interest on its
arrearages.50 Although a creditor suffers "incidental adverse effects"
43. Id. at 896-97. The court did not refer specifically to any legislative history. Moreover,
another court, failing to perceive this legislative intent, noted that the Code nowhere implies that
§ 1322(b) is a "special exception" to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). In re Small, 65 B.R. 686, 692
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
44. Section 1325, the cram down provision, "allows a debtor to modify the rights of secured
creditors by reducing payments." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30 % 1322.09[4].
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2) (1988).
46. 780 F.2d at 897. The court's opinion regarding modification is inconsistent. First, the
court held that "residential mortgages that would otherwise permit the lender to declare the entire
debt presently due may be modified by the plan to cure the default and reinstate regular installment
payments." Id. at 896. Next, the court concluded that mortgage claims are not subject to § 1325
because they cannot be modified. Id. at 897.
47. Id
48. 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 776.
50. Id. at 775-77. In an extensive and persuasive analysis of this issue, the Capps court relied
on multiple sources to reach its conclusion. First, it looked to its recent decision in In re Roach, 824
F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987). In Roach, the court made several relevant findings in determining that
Congress did not envision cure as a modification: (1) Congress placed the modification provision,
§ 1322(b)(2) separate from the cure provisions, §§ 1322(b)(3) and 1322(b)(5); (2) the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States "distinguished the authorization to cure defaults on a
home mortgage from the power to modify claimants' rights"; (3) the Senate and House highlighted
differences between cure and modification in their debates; and (4) in Chapter 11 counterparts to
Chapter 13, the Code differentiated between cure and modification. Roach, 824 F.2d at 1375-76.
Next, the Capps court cited the Collier treatise, which states in part:
The present value test compensates creditors whose rights have been modified by reduc-
tions in payments, interest charges or the total amount due; where a default is cured, how-
ever, the creditor's rights are not modified. Since the coiitract terms remain in force
Washington University Open Scholarship
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when a debtor cures,5 1 these effects do not embody a complete modifica-
tion of the agreement.52 Absent a contract provision to the contrary, the
debtor need not pay interest on prepetition arrearages. 53
In Landmark Financial Services v. Hall,54 the Fourth Circuit contin-
ued the trend denying oversecured creditors interest on mortgage arrear-
ages.55 Like its predecessors, the court initially distinguished cure
pursuant to section 1322(b) from cram down pursuant to section
1325(a)(5).56 While cram down assures the secured creditor the present
value of his claim during the life of the plan, a cure reinstates the original
pre-bankruptcy agreement. 57 Because cures do not modify creditors'
rights, the present value requirement of section 1325 is irrelevant here.58
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
section 506(b) in Ron Pair, but refused to apply it to the cure scenario
and thus declined to allow an oversecured mortgagee to collect interest
on arrearages. 59  The court concluded that a cure relies on non-bank-
ruptcy law and agreements, which removes it from provisions such as
sections 1325(a)(5) and 506(b), which purport to revalue claims over
time pursuant to the Code.6' However, the Landmark court did concede
(except for the injunction against foreclosure) the time value of money is irrelevant The
creditor receives his interest, charges and costs to which it is entitled under contract and
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Capps, 836 F.2d at 776 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30 1322.09[4]).
Finally, the Capps court surmised that, in essence, cure requires adherence to original contracts
for its terms. 836 F.2d at 777. The court supported this premise with a discussion of the pre-Code
procedure for cure which occurred outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 777 n.9. See supra
note 30.
51. 836 F.2d at 776. For example, the creditor loses his right to foreclose and collect on arrear-
ages after expiration of the contract period for cure. Also, the prolonged period over which the
debtor pays the arrearage burdens the creditor because he will not earn interest during this period.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 777. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit did not consider the implications of
§ 506(b).
54. 918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 1152.
56. Id. at 1154.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court cited Capps as support for the principle that cramdown necessarily involves
modification. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59. 918 F.2d at 1154. This was the first circuit court to address the issue after the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989). See supra text
accompanying notes 16-22.
60. 918 F.2d at 1154-55. A debtor may be responsible for additional charges when he cures a
default. However, the debtor's liability for these charges arises from the original loan agreement, not
from the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
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that any applicable state law requiring interest on mortgage arrearages
would control.61
Finally, in Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re
Laguna),6" the Ninth Circuit relied substantially on the Landmark case
and on a well-known bankruptcy treatise63 to conclude that interest on
arrearages is not allowable." Although the court accepted that section
506(b) generally entitles an oversecured creditor to postpetition interest,
it noted that sections 1322(b) and 1325(a) qualify this right.65 The court
then simply cited at length the Landmark court's rationale for distin-
guishing between a cure and a modification.66
In Wade v. Hannon,67 the Tenth Circuit departed from the recent
trend in the United States Courts of Appeals by allowing an oversecured
mortgagee to collect postpetition interest on mortgage arrearages when a
debtor cures prepetition defaults.68 The court identified three core ele-
ments permeating the other circuits' opinions denying interest on arrear-
ages: (1) cure does not modify the mortgagee's rights under the
mortgage contract; (2) cure occurs under the contracts themselves,
outside the realm of bankruptcy law; and (3) legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to distinguish between mortgages on principal
residences and other oversecured creditors' claims. 6 9 The Wade court
dismissed each of these premises and rejected the findings of the other
courts that had addressed the issue.
First, the court proposed that a cure under section 1322(b) actually
does modify a mortgagee's rights under a contract in at least three
ways.70 Cure denies the implementation of acceleration clauses by per-
61. Id. at 1155. The court found no pertinent Virginia law on the issue. Id.
62. 944 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1577 (1992).
63. See id. at 544-45 (relying on COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 30).
64. 944 F.2d at 544-45.
65. Id. at 544. As support for this premise, the court cited its earlier holding in Seidel v.
Larson (In re Seidel), 752 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the relationship between cure and
modification and determining that extending the time for payment under a plan beyond the time
originally contemplated by the creditor is an impermissible modification).
Other courts also have perceived that more specific Chapter 13 provisions supersede § 506(b). See
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Adams, 142 B.R. 331, 333 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that more specific
provisions relating to Chapter 13 take precedence over more general Code sections).
66. 944 F.2d at 544-45.
67. 968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 1042. The court explicitly noted its reluctance to disagree with 13 out of 15 circuit
judges who decided the issue and with the most renowned author on bankruptcy law. Id. at 1040.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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mitring cure "within a reasonable time";71 it bars the mortgagee's right
to foreclose; and it abridges the customary contract provision that all
default payments are immediately due.72 In response to the contention
that the effects of cure do not amount to a "modification" as contem-
plated by section 1322(b)(2), 73 the Wade court concluded that such dis-
tinctions improperly treat "modification" as a term of art, instead of the
practical term which Congress envisioned.74
Next, the Wade court rejected the argument that a cure occurs outside
of the bankruptcy realm, so that the original contract terms govern. 75
First, the court observed that cure clearly combines both contract and
Code-supplied provisions. 76 For example, notwithstanding contract pro-
visions to the contrary, the Code protects the mortgagor by allotting a
"reasonable" time to repay defaults, by authorizing installments as a
method to pay arrearages and by barring foreclosure as a remedy.
77 If
these provisions supersede express contract principles, the court reasoned
that it would be unreasonable to rely on the absence of interest provisions
in the contract.71 Second, the court compared the mortgagee's claim to
other secured claims.79 Although the court conceded that an over-
secured mortgagee's claim is distinguishable from claims governed by
section 1325(a)(5),10 it held the Code's plain language requires that a
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
72. 968 F.2d at 1040.
73. Such cases include Terry, in which the court conceded that the cure provisions modified the
contract, but concluded that the changes did not amount to a "modification," see supra note 46; and
Capps, in which the court noted a cure's "adverse effects" on mortgage contracts, but again denied
that these effects represented a "modification." See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
74. 968 F.2d at 1040.
75. Id. at 1041. The Third and Fourth Circuits especially relied on this argument. See supra
notes 50, 60 and accompanying text.
76. 968 F.2d at 1041.
77. Id. Emphasizing the impact of such Code modifications, the court declared that "[i]t seems
wholly unreasonable to eviscerate the contract provisions of acceleration and foreclosure and then
find binding the absence of a term regarding interest on arrearages." Id.
78. 968 F.2d at 1041.
79. Id. While some courts attempt to distinguish a mortgagee's so-called "security interest"
from an ordinary claim, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, § 1322(b) itself deems a mortga-
gee's interest a "claim." See supra note 4 for text of § 1322(b).
80. 968 F.2d at 1041. The cram down provisions apply to claims which the debtor must, pay in
full during the term of the plan and which may involve reducing payments, decreasing interest rates
or making other changes in the creditor's claim. Id. A mortgage claim differs because it is long.term
and its payments and interest rates cannot be reduced. Id.
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mortgagee's oversecured claim earn interest pursuant to section 506(b).81
Third, the court rejected other courts' analysis of the legislative his-
tory8 2 and determined that Congress intended to treat mortgagees differ-
ently from other oversecured creditors because the statutes were not
ambiguous.13 The court found that the plain language of the no-modifi-
cation clause, section 1322(b)(2), means only that the debtor's plan can-
not reduce the amount of payments, decrease the interest rate or extend
the term of the mortgage.84 Conversely, the cure provision relates to the
payment of past due amounts.85 These provisions do not imply that Con-
gress intended to deny mortgagees the right to interest on arrearages.8 6
Finally, the court found that even assuming that the statute was ambigu-
ous, the legislative history did not reveal a congressional intent to dis-
criminate in any way against home mortgagees. 7
The Wade court's reasoning is faulty. Unfortunately, it generates un-
certainty concerning an issue which the circuit courts previously ap-
peared to have settled. 8 Initially, the Wade court failed to appreciate
the well-established distinction between cure and modification.89 Be-
cause cure necessitates some changes in the original loan situation,' the
court mistakenly deduced that it is a form of modification.9 However,
81. Id. The court asserted that only a showing of congressional intent to differentiate between
home mortgages and other oversecured claims could prevent a conclusion that § 506(b) applied. Id.
82. Id. The Terry, Capps, Landmarks, and Laguna courts all concluded that Congress did
contemplate a distinction. See supra notes 43, 50, 60, 65 and accompanying text.
83. 968 F.2d at 1041. The basic tenets of statutory construction permit a court to resort to
legislative history only when a statute is ambiguous. Id. (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197,
2200 (1991)). According to the court, § 1322(b) is clear on its face. Id.
84. 968 F.2d at 1042.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id. The court only cited Ron Pair as holding that "legislative history of [the] Bankruptcy
Code does not shed light on [the] question of postpetition interest." Id. Perhaps the court com-
pleted a more extensive search before making such a broad conclusion; however, it did not document
any such research.
88. While one should not disregard completely the minority position in Colegrove, it contained
a strong dissent, it is severely criticized in the premier treatise on bankruptcy, and it must be consid-
ered in its context as the first in a long line of circuit cases which rejected its findings. See supra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 50-52, 56-58, 64 and accompanying text. See also In re Clark, 738 F.2d
869, 872 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is clear that Congress intended 'cure' to mean something different from
'modify'; otherwise, in light of [§ 1322](bX2), [§ 13221(b)(3) [and arguably [§ 1322](b)(5)] would be
superfluous."); In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) ('curing defaults and maintaining
payments under [§ 1322(bX5)] is not a modification").
90. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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Congress would not have coined different terms and enacted separate
provisions to govern cure and modification if it viewed cure as merely an
offshoot of modification. 92
More importantly, the Wade court incorrectly assumed that nothing
in the Code or its legislative history suggests that section 506(b) should
not apply to home mortgage claims. It is clear from both the plain lan-
guage of section 1322(b)(2) and its legislative history that Congress in-
tended to treat security interests on principal residences differently from
other claims.93 Simply by formulating section 1322(b)(2) to regulate
these claims, Congress affords them special treatment.
The Wade court's decision also contravenes canons of statutory con-
struction. These rules state that provisions specifically relating to a spe-
cific subject prevail over more general provisions.94 Although section
506 generally provides oversecured creditors with interest, section
1322(b)(2) specifically mandates that mortgage claims may not be modi-
fied.95 Awarding interest pursuant to section 506(b) obviously modifies
the claim.96 In light of this conflict, the court should have held that
section 1322(b)(2) precludes any application of section 506(b) to interest
arrearages.
Finally, in the context of policy, the Wade decision unfairly favors the
creditor who already occupies a position far superior to that of the
debtor. The Code itself purposefully protects the mortgagee97 at the ex-
pense of the mortgagor by barring typical modifications such as reducing
payment and extending time frames.9" In addition, the professional
lender easily can protect itself from the possibility that it might lose in-
terest on arrearages. 99 The Wade court refused to confer a slight burden
92. Aware of this reasoning, the court later attempted to reconcile the existence of two provi-
sions with its holding that cure modifies a claim by arbitrarily determining that a cure relates to
paying the amount past due, while modification relates to reducing payments, decreasing interest
rates or extending the period ofthe note. The court cited no authority for this proposition. 968 F.2d
at 1042.
93. See supra notes 30, 40, 43 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 65.
95. See supra notes 27-28, 42 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Nothing in the Code or its history indicates that
interest on arrearages is incidental to cure.
97. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See generally Regina L. Nassen, Note, Bank-
ruptcy Code Section 1322(b)(2)s No-Modification Clause: Who Does It Protect?, 33 ARIZ. L. REV.
979 (1991).
98. See supra note 80.
99. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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on the lender by accepting that it simply should insert a provision for
interest on arrearages in the original loan document to avoid this issue
altogether."° It is reasonable to expect professional lenders to provide
for loan default and subsequent bankruptcy filing, a relatively common
occurrence in American businesses.
In summary, the Tenth Circuit, holding that section 506(b) requires a
Chapter 13 debtor to pay postpetition interest on prepetition mortgage
arrearages upon cure, brought the federal circuit courts back in a full
circle on the interest on arrearages issue. 10 1 By somewhat evening the
split between the circuits and reasserting what appeared to be an out-
dated conclusion, the Tenth Circuit substantially improved the powerful
mortgagee's position in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and placed a
greater burden on the individual mortgagor.
Julia A. Jansen
100. 968 F.2d at 1042.
101. Although the Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Sixth Circuit, it asserted a
different rationale. The Sixth Circuit determined that paying interest is not a modification of the
claim, but an incidental aspect of cure. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held that paying interest is a
statutory modification required by § 506(b). See supra notes 33-37, 67-86 and accompanying text.
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